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Life After Civil Death: 
Felony and Mormon Disenfranchisement 
in the U.S. West (1880-1890) 
 
by 
 
Winston A. Bowman 
 
  
 The voter possesses a mere privilege; … the States have supreme control over this privilege; … 
taking it away, or what is the same thing, refusing to confer it, does not impair a right, and can 
not be regarded as a penalty or punishment.1 
          
                                      John Norton Pomeroy, 1873. 
 
Introduction: 
Pomeroy’s understanding of the nature of the franchise may seem foreign to many 
present-day Americans, but this vision is the one to which most nineteenth-century jurists, 
scholars, and politicians subscribed.  It is worth noting that Pomeroy wrote these words in the 
aftermath of the post-Civil War rights revolution and half a century after the expansion of the 
franchise under the auspices of Jacksonian democracy.2  This attitude toward voting rights was 
not abandoned following the passage of the reconstruction amendments.  Instead, the idea of a 
limited franchise was affirmed time and again in the post-bellum era.  Pomeroy’s franchise (one 
in which “the voter possesses a mere privilege,” and the states control the exercise of that 
privilege) remains an important component of the American electoral system.3 
                                                 
1 John Norton Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States, 4th Revised Edition (Fred B. 
Rothman & Co.) 1997 (originally published 1873), Section 535.  For an account of Pomeroy’s influence on many of 
the legal concepts discussed in this article, see William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: 
Law and Ideology in America, 1886-1937 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 79-80. 
2 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-77 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).  See 
also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); 
Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in America (New York: Basic Books, 
2000). 
3 Ibid. 
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 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a larger portion of the population was 
vouchsafed voting privileges than the nation’s founders might have imagined or thought 
desirable.  But there has never been a formal recognition of a right to vote as a concomitant of 
U.S. citizenship.4  Voting remains a revocable privilege.  To many this legal distinction may 
seem unimportant provided the vast majority of adult citizens are able to cast ballots, should they 
so desire, on Election Day. 
 This study seeks to demonstrate the weaknesses of this inclination, and stresses ways in 
which the persistence of the original structure of voter regulation in America could potentially 
lead, and perhaps already has led, to undesirable consequences.  Specifically, this examination 
demonstrates how the inchoate series of restrictions on state’s power to limit the franchise has 
facilitated the continued disenfranchisement of at least one segment of the nation’s potential 
electorate: felons and ex-convicts. 
 Convicted felons and ex-convicts comprise the largest group of disenfranchised adult 
citizens in the United States today.5  Laws removing voting privileges from felons bar more than 
4 million otherwise eligible voters from the nation’s poll-booths.6  While the contested 2000 
Presidential Election has focused some media attention on current legislation prohibiting felons 
and ex-felons from voting, relatively little has been written about the historical development of 
                                                 
4 An avalanche of scholarship and court cases from the passage of the reconstruction amendments through to the 
present day bear out this denial of a fundamental right to vote.  See Mark E. Thompson, “Don’t do the Crime if you 
Ever Intend to Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment” 33 
Seton Hall Law Review, 167 (2002); Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States,” Wisconsin Law Review 1045 (2002); Alexander Keyssar, “The Right 
to Vote and Election 2000,” The Unfinished Election of 2000, ed. Jack N. Rakove (New York: Basic Books, 2001); 
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Guinn v. United States 238 
U.S. 347 (1915); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874); Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
5 The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States; The Sentencing Project of Human Rights 
Watch, www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/us98o-)1.htm 
6 Alexander Keyssar, “The Right to Vote and Election 2000,” p. 86. 
7 Ibid. 
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such laws.  According to historian Alexander Keyssar, “the history of laws disenfranchising 
felons is long, complex, and… not well understood.”7 
 While few studies treat the historical development of this remarkable phenomenon 
exclusively, much research has focused on broader issues involving the history of voting rights.  
Many of these inquiries have yielded important findings, but most have focused on the late 
nineteenth-century South at the expense of other regions.8  By emphasizing the importance of 
conflicts in the U.S. West during the 1880s, this examination seeks to add to the important legal-
historical research on the evolution of voting rights in America. 
At common law, felons suffered a “civil death.”  This label entailed, among other 
consequences, the permanent loss of political rights.9  While laws stripping convicted felons of 
their voting privileges trace their roots back to these English legal traditions, many 
disenfranchisement laws changed in both character and intent from 1880 to 1910.  “In the 
South,” for example, “laws were generally rewritten to target ‘black crimes’ and exclude as 
many African-Americans as possible.”10  In 1901 the newly adopted State Constitution of 
Alabama excluded a laundry list of criminals from the franchise: 
Those who shall be convicted of treason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, 
receiving stolen property, obtaining property or money under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of 
perjury, robbery, assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and battery on the wife, 
bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy, incest, rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any infamous crime or crime involving moral 
turpitude; also, any person who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or of selling or offering to sell his 
vote or the vote of another, or of buying or offering to buy the vote of another.11 
 
                                                 
 
8 For examples see Robert A. Margo, Disenfranchisement, School Finance, and the Economics of Segregated 
Schools in the United States (New York: Garland, 1985); Michael Perman, Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement 
in the South, 1888-1908 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
9 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), book IV, chapter 1, 
p. 7-20. 
10 Alexander Keyssar, “The Right to Vote and Election 2000,” 86. 
11 Constitution of the State of Alabama (1901), Article VIII, Sect. 182. 
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Alabama’s attempts to disenfranchise African-Americans through laws ostensibly 
designed to disenfranchise criminals regardless of race were so effective that the state’s election 
registrars estimated that by 1903 this provision had stripped approximately ten times as many 
blacks of their voting privileges as it had whites.12  The Supreme Court eventually ruled this 
provision unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.13 
Evidently, racial minorities were not the only groups affected by what shall be referred to 
throughout this study as “targeted” felony disenfranchisement, nor did the South hold a monopoly 
on such tactics.  Determined to limit the efficacy of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints and remove the potential for Mormons to repeal anti-polygamy laws through bloc-voting, 
Congress and the legislatures of several western states and territories created a series of laws in 
the 1880s designed to remove voting privileges from anyone convicted of polygamy.  As the title 
of this study suggests, these laws and the debates over their validity have exerted a lasting 
influence over the jurisprudence of felony disenfranchisement.  An examination of felony and 
Mormon disenfranchisement legislation in the late-nineteenth-century U.S. West provides a 
vantage point from which to view and evaluate laws, many of which remain unchanged since 
those years, that currently deny felons the vote. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
13 It should be noted that a significant percentage, perhaps even as many as 40%, of the original Mormon population 
did not participate in this relocation and stayed primarily in the Midwest.  See Dean L. May, “A Demographic 
Portrait of the Mormons, 1830-1890,” Thomas G. Alexander and Jessie L. Embry eds., After 150 Years: The Latter-
day Saints in Sesquicentennial Perspective (Midvale, Utah: Signature Books, 1983), 37-70. 
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Murphy v. Ramsey (1885) and the National Response to Polygamy in the West: 
One might expect, following the Church’s mid-nineteenth-century migration to Utah, that 
conflicts over Mormon polygamy were primarily regional affairs.14  But the persistence of the 
“twin relic of barbarism” more than twenty years after the abolition of slavery (polygamy’s twin) 
and Mormon claims of laws, based primarily on religious principles, superior to the U.S. 
Constitution inflamed the nation’s religious and political passions and led to a concerted effort to 
deal definitively with “the Mormon question.”15  Often equating plural marriage with slavery, 
post-Civil War Republicans were the fiercest crusaders in the campaign against polygamy.16  
Mormons generally gravitated to the rhetoric of state and local sovereignty pronounced by 
conservative Democrats, many of whom were wary of federal intervention in local affairs, even 
when directed at the much-maligned Saints.17   
 While attempts to disenfranchise Mormons during the late nineteenth century were driven 
primarily by concerns about the perceived immoral and undemocratic components of the Saints’ 
lifestyle and ideology, some scholars have also pointed out parallels between opposition to 
Mormonism and attitudes toward race and ethnicity following Reconstruction.18  Although 
conceptions of race were often bound to some brand of pseudo-science during this period, many 
westerners drew close connections between the Mormon, Indian, and Chinese “questions.”19  As 
                                                 
14 Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 As Gordon notes, Southern conservatives dashed several antebellum attempts at anti-polygamy efforts, sensing the 
possibility of the erosion of legal protection for their own “peculiar domestic institution.”  See Gordon, The Mormon 
Question, 57. 
18 See Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: 
Norton, 1987), 259-288.   
19 Ibid; Gordon, The Mormon Question, 205.   
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was the case with Native and Asian Americans, many westerners considered Mormons’ perceived 
oddities irreconcilable with notions of what a proper U.S. citizen should be.20  
 There were, of course, real and important differences between the Mormons and other 
maligned minorities in the West during the late nineteenth century that made the Saints less 
susceptible to various modes of discrimination that proved effective against other groups.  
Population estimates, for example, indicate that the vast majority of Utah Mormons were of 
Northern or Western European heritage, or recent immigrants from those areas, and literacy rates 
were generally high among Mormon populations.21  But the linkage between Mormons and 
polygamy left them vulnerable to felony disenfranchisement laws.  
 Since the Saints were so strongly associated with an illegal act in the public 
consciousness, legislators were able to form a legal connection between felony 
disenfranchisement and anti-Mormon legislation.  Although state and territorial legislatures 
typically promulgated laws disenfranchising felons, pressure to act against Mormon polygamy in 
the West and the poor prospects for a voluntary set of restrictions on polygamists’ voting 
privileges in Utah, prompted Congressional leaders to act on Mormon polygamy.22   
 Congress’ initial answer to the Mormon question was the Edmunds Act (1882).23  The act 
not only outlawed bigamy and polygamy in U.S. territories, but also provided for the 
disenfranchisement of all those convicted of such crimes.  Section 8 stated, “No polygamist [or] 
                                                 
20 Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest, 259-288. 
21 See May, “A Demographic Portrait of the Mormons,” 67; U.S. Historical Census Database, available online at: 
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/censusbin/census/cen.pl. 
22 See Gordon, The Mormon Question, 147-82. 
23 An Act to Amend Section 5352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, In Reference to Bigamy and for other 
Purposes (1882), commonly referred to as The Edmunds Act. 
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bigamist … and no woman24 cohabiting with any [bigamist or polygamist], in any Territory … 
shall be entitled to vote at any election held in any such Territory or other place.”25  The act also 
prohibited polygamists from holding office in the U.S. or its territories.26  
Vacating all voting official positions held in the Utah Territory at the time of its 
enactment, the Edmunds Act created a five-man board of commissioners, to be selected by the 
President of the United States.27  These commissioners were to appoint a series of “loyal” (non-
Mormon) election officials in the territory who would, in turn, see to it that no polygamists 
slipped through the broad net cast by the act.  To ensure the efficiency of disenfranchisement 
policy in the territory, the new board of election officials created a “test oath” intended to weed-
out, and allow for the prosecution of, polygamists.28  The oath required would-be voters to swear 
that they were neither bigamists nor polygamists as defined by the act.  
Although some anti-polygamy crusaders criticized it as ineffective, the impact of the 
Edmunds Act was forcefully evident within a few years of its passage.  An 1885 article in the 
New York Times stated that the law had, in the space of three years, stripped some 15,000 
Mormons of their voting privileges in the Utah territory alone.29  Indeed, several prominent 
Mormon leaders, including George Cannon, one of the foremost proponents of polygamy and a 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, women were granted voting privileges in Utah in 1870, long before female citizens of most other 
states and territories.  In an unprecedented move, Congress later completely removed these privileges from women in 
the territory.  See Gordon, The Mormon Question, 97, 164-172. 
25 Edmunds Act, section 8. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, Section 9. 
28 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). 
29 “The Law is Not a Failure,” New York Times, May 4, 1885, 4-3.  This statistic, if accurate, seems particularly 
startling when one considers that, according to the 1890 U.S. Census, approximately 112,000 persons, 21 or older, 
resided in Utah.  See U.S. Historical Census Database. 
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prospective congressional delegate, were imprisoned and disenfranchised under the auspices of 
the act.30 
While the Edmunds Act effectively ensured the destabilization of a potentially powerful 
Mormon voting bloc in the West, it proved vulnerable to constitutional assault.  The legislation’s 
opponents charged that it imposed an ex post facto punishment on those who had been practicing 
bigamists or polygamists before the bill’s passage, but who had, by 1882, abstained from living 
with more than one wife.  Taking their pleas to the U.S. Supreme Court, a group of Utah 
Mormons in this predicament brought forward the first major challenge to disenfranchisement in 
the West.31  Murphy v. Ramsey (1885), the case precipitated by these challenges, was to prove a 
crucial case in the history of felony and Mormon disenfranchisement.  
Writing on behalf of a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Stanley Matthews ruled the 
Edmunds Act, and the test oath created under its auspices, constitutional.  Matthews held that 
cohabitation was not a necessary or sufficient state for polygamy and that disenfranchisement was 
simply an alteration to the qualifications for voting, and as such not a retroactive punishment or, 
for that matter, a punishment at all.32  The Murphy demonstrated that the Court would offer no 
refuge to Mormons, who were seemingly under attack from every other angle and gave legal 
sanction to the practice of tailoring felony disenfranchisement laws to target Mormons.   
For opponents of Mormonism in the West, the Edmunds Act was an important check 
against the potential power of a Latter-day Saint voting bloc, but for most it did not do enough to 
curtail Mormon influence in the West.  Specifically, the act denied the vote only to polygamous 
Mormons.  Indeed, “Edmunds” explicitly stated, in order to avoid other potential constitutional 
                                                 
30 Gordon, The Mormon Question, 211-12. 
31 Murphy v. Ramsey (1885). 
32 Ibid. 
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objections, that election officials could not, “refuse to count any… vote on account of the opinion 
of the person casting it on the subject of bigamy or polygamy.”33  Over the next few years, the 
legislatures of several western states and territories attempted to create a more extensive brand of 
felony disenfranchisement that would cover their entire Mormon populations. 
The Mormon Question in Nevada and Idaho: 
 During the late 1880s, Nevada legislators, led by U.S. Senator William M. Stewart, 
pushed to annex territory from the southern tip of the Idaho Territory.  Although the plan had its 
political and economic benefits,34 southern Idaho had more than its share of potential problems.  
For more than a decade, the area had been home to some of the nation’s most ferocious anti-
Mormon conflict.35  Fears that the Latter-day Saints might expand their control beyond Utah’s 
territorial borders seemed to have been partially realized in Idaho in the early 1880s, as Mormons 
exercised political rights and continued to gain strength throughout the decade.  With the 
Territory’s Mormon population at its strongest near the Idaho-Nevada border, the proposed 
annexation (along with the possibility of further annexations from Utah) brought with it calls for 
effective Mormon disenfranchisement laws that would avoid a replication of the widespread 
political conflict experienced in Idaho.  Politicians in both Nevada and Idaho saw the Mormon 
question as a possible roadblock to annexation.  “In joining a portion of [Idaho’s] territory with 
ours,” Stewart claimed, “[Idaho’s non-Mormons] ask perfect security against Mormon rule and 
aggressions, and we must give it to them.”36       
                                                 
33 An Act to Amend Section 5352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, In Reference to Bigamy and for other 
Purposes (1882).   
34 Stewart pushed for annexation claiming that the move would ease economic hardships by doubling the State’s 
taxable property and increasing the population to levels comparable to other states.  See Elliott, Servant of Power, 
101-110. 
35 See Wells, Anti-Mormonism in Idaho. 
36 “The Anti-Mormon Bill Passes the Senate,” Daily Territorial Enterprise, February 10, 1887, pg. 1. 
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In 1887, Nevada legislators sought to ease these anxieties by attempting to disenfranchise 
all of the state’s sizable LDS population.37  The state’s lawmakers passed two pieces of legislation 
designed to severely restrict the political power of Mormons.38  In January 1887, the state senate 
passed a proposal to amend the state’s constitution to provide for the disenfranchisement of all 
members of the Church of Latter-day Saints.39   On February 7, 1887, after a number of minor 
inter-cameral scuffles over revisions and amendments in joint committees,40 the assembly 
approved the proposal unanimously (38-0, with 2 absences).41  The revised version of the 
amendment then went back to the Senate for approval.   
On February 9, 1887, the Senate passed the measure to amend the Constitution 16-3.42   
Although the Nevada Constitution called for both houses to approve amendments in two 
consecutive legislative sessions,43 the initial majorities in both the assembly and the senate 
suggested that attaining such approval would not prove onerous for the amendment’s supporters.  
                                                 
37 While reliable population statistics for Mormons living in nineteenth-century Nevada are hard to come by, 
evidence would suggest a fairly large Mormon presence in the state, particularly in the northern and eastern counties, 
during this period.  See Eric N. Moody, “Nevada’s Anti-Mormon Legislation of 1887 and Southern Idaho 
Annexation,” Nevada Historical Society Quarterly (Reno: Nevada Historical Society, 1979), 21-32. Moody cites 
estimates that place the Mormon population of Nevada somewhere between 150 and 2,000.  The Church of Latter-
day Saints Institute of Religion in Las Vegas, NV estimates a Mormon population approximately 10% that of the 
state’s total population during the 1880s, while 1890 census records suggest that 525 Mormons lived in Nevada 
(about 4.4% of the total census population) but even census numbers are questionable because Mormons were 
notoriously under-reported.  See May, “A Demographic Portrait of the Mormons.” Although Mormons did not hold a 
majority in any Nevada county, Moody notes that Lincoln County’s Mormon population might have been as high as 
17% of the total population.  See Moody, “Nevada’s Anti-Mormon Legislation,” 23.  The significance of any of these 
numbers is difficult to gauge when one considers the dramatic swings in population and demographics in Nevada 
during the period.  From 1880 to 1890, for example, the state’s total census population fell precipitously, from 62,266 
to 45,761 (a 26.5% drop brought on by hard economic times and an attendant exodus of miners).  See U.S. Historical 
Database. 
38 As we shall see, a third piece of legislation was proposed, but little came of that effort.  See Moody, “Nevada’s 
Anti-Mormon Legislation.” 
39 Journal of the Thirteenth Session of the Senate of the State of Nevada, 1887, 114, 116, 117, 126-7, 143, 160, 168, 
203-4, 209. 
40 Journal of the Thirteenth Session of the Assembly of the State of Nevada, 1887, 133-4.  The Senate initially refused 
to concur with these amendments, but eventually acquiesced following a unanimous Assembly vote in which the 
House chose not to recede (ibid, 148, 154). 
41 13th Session Assembly Journal, 133-4, 148, 154. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Constitution of the State of Nevada, Article XVI, section 1. 
 
 
11
 
The final version of the amendment combined felony disenfranchisement in the mold of the 
Edmunds Act with blanket religious disenfranchisement.44 
Concerned with the lengthy process of state constitutional amendment ratification,45 and 
wishing to prevent Mormons from voting in the upcoming 1888 election, the State Assembly also 
sought to disenfranchise Nevada’s Latter-day Saint population via statute.46  On February 18, 
1887, the lower house passed unanimously, “An Act Prescribing the Qualifications and 
Modifying the Oath for the Registration of Voters in Conformity therewith.”47   The act stated 
simply that, “no person shall be allowed to vote at an election in this state… who is a member of 
or belongs to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, commonly called the Mormon 
Church.”48  The bill also established a test oath, which required those wishing to register to vote 
to swear that they were not members of the Mormon Church.49  Although the bill, commonly 
known as the “Anti-Mormon Bill” or “Anti-Mormon Oath,”50 glided easily through the state 
assembly, its passage through the senate was a more difficult one.51     
                                                 
44 Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Nevada No. XII – Senate and Concurrent Resolution, 
relative to amending the Constitution of the State of Nevada.  The proposed amendment was apparently inexplicably 
reprinted in The Daily territorial Enterprise, September 28, 1888, pg. 4 and several editions of various other Nevada 
newspapers before the 1888 elections as Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Nevada No. XIV, 
but as far as the author is able to determine, the proposal was officially referred to as cited. 
45 See Elliot, Servant of Power, 104-5. 
46 13th Session Nev. Assembly Journal, 190, 195, 203, 219, 326, 336, 356. 
47 An Act Prescribing the Qualifications and Modifying the Oath for the Registration of Voters in Conformity 
therewith (Nev. Stat. 1887, 106); (Nev. Stat. 1887, 107).  The Assembly vote count was 34-0, with 6 absences.  13th 
Session Nev. Assembly Journal, 219. 
48 Nev. Stat. 1887, 106. 
49 Ibid; State ex rel Whitney v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198 (1888). 
50 The Esmeralda News, October 13, 1888, pg. 2. 
51 Henry L. Fish, a senator from Washoe County, disapproved of the voting ban on all Mormons because he felt it 
ignored important distinctions between “old Mormons” and Josephites.  Fish, who did eventually vote for the bill’s 
passage, claimed that the Josephites, “neither practice nor recognize polygamy or bigamy, but are good, true citizens 
of the Republic, while the old Mormon Church is not.”  See “Anti-Mormon Bill Passes Senate.”  The day after the 
assembly passed its statutory ban on Mormon voting, Fish proposed a similar, but more nuanced, law that passed the 
Senate by a slender 11 to 8 majority but was narrowly defeated in the State Assembly.  See Moody, “Nevada’s Anti-
Mormon Legislation,” 29-30.  
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Several senators appear to have been concerned from the outset that the assembly’s Anti-
Mormon Bill would not pass constitutional muster.   Senator Henry Harris from Douglas County 
objected to the legislation on constitutional grounds.  “If a man commits a crime he should be 
punished, regardless of any religious belief he may or may not have,” Harris claimed - apparently 
concerned by the legislature’s departure from the principle of removing voting privileges only 
from those Mormons convicted of polygamy.52  According to Harris, the new legislation, which 
disenfranchised all members of the religious group, rather than convicted polygamists only, was, 
“in direct conflict with the State Constitution, which gives the franchise to all, regardless of 
religious belief.”53   
Harris’ misgivings about the bill’s constitutionality are echoic of broader legal and 
political debates over the limits constitutions imposed upon the legislative will and may have 
been based on the principle, best articulated by the prominent jurist and legal scholar Thomas M. 
Cooley, that although no constitutionally protected right to vote existed, restrictions upon the 
franchise could be made only via state constitutional provisions.54  Certainly, Cooley-esque 
notions of the limits of legislative power influenced changing conceptions of the franchise during 
                                                 
52 “Anti-Mormon Bill Passes Senate.” 
53 Ibid.  See “Anti-Mormon Bill passes Senate.”       
54 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which rest upon the Legislative Power of the 
States of the American Union (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890), 758.  Cooley’s standing as one of the 
most influential legal minds of the nineteenth century and one of the leading figures in the immergence and early 
development of American Constitutional law is widely accepted.  Legal historian William J. Novak notes that 
Cooley’s treatises “moved constitutionalism from the periphery to the center of American jurisprudence as the 
definitive oracle on governmental power and individual liberty, public aspirations and private freedoms.”  William J. 
Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996), 246.   
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this period.55  The post-Reconstruction jurisprudence of voting rights was shaped in equal parts by 
political exigency and the timely ascendance of constitutional law.56   
Many legal historians point to the period from the 1870s to the turn of the century as the 
era in which constitutional law took hold in America’s institutions of legal learning, the bar, and 
the bench.57  Drawing upon the earlier works of legal thinkers and treatise writers like Cooley and 
Joseph Story, many scholars, lawyers, and judges during the last third of the nineteenth century 
placed an increasing emphasis on constitutional interpretation.58  This sweeping legal movement 
had major implications for the franchise.  
According to Keyssar, during the latter part of the nineteenth century jurists and legal 
scholars “drew increasingly numerous, if sometimes jagged, lines between state constitutional 
                                                 
55 For examples of these uses see Nancy Cohen, The Reconstruction of American Liberty, 1865-1914 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 137-40. 
56 See Novak, The People’s Welfare.   Certainly, the ways in which the general tenets classical legal thought were 
adapted to legal theories regarding voting privileges appear to have been shaped by the desire for less federal 
interference in state and local elections but a dedication to the avoidance of legislative interference in that arena led to 
increased restrictions upon state legislators as well.  See Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 166-8; Wiecek, The Lost World 
of Classical Thought, 79-80, 95-97; Cohen, The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 137-40.     
57 For examples of research by several leading legal historians that place such an emphasis on this period see Novak, 
The People’s Welfare; Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the 
Era of Slave Emancipation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gordon, The Mormon Question, Amar, 
The Bill of Rights; Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People, Vol. 2: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1998); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought; Barbara Young 
Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 
(New York: Basic Books, 1993).  
58 Novak, The People’s Welfare.  These authors should not be confused with those who later expropriated their work 
for their own purposes.  Although many historians have portrayed Cooley, for example, as a proto-laissez faire 
conservative, he was actually a Jacksonian Democrat who, as an early member of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, was often involved with regulatory legislation not entirely dissimilar to laws progressive reformers and 
historians often blamed his modes of legal thought for obstructing.  For such critical accounts of Cooley’s influence 
see Benjamin R. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire came to the Supreme Court (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1924); Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. 
Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman and John F. Dillon upon American Constitutional Law (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1954).  Novak, among others, has done much to explode the progressive mythology surrounding 
mid-nineteenth-century treatise writers like Cooley, Tiedeman and Dillon.  See Novak, “The Legal Origins of the 
Modern American State” in Bryant Garth, Robert Kagan, and Austin Sarat, eds., Looking Back at Law’s Century 
 14
 
authority and the power of the state legislatures.”59  Although the U.S. Constitution granted states 
the power to regulate elections, adherents of the new constitutionalism held that states could only 
create major substantive suffrage restrictions or qualifications through their constitutions.  As 
Keyssar notes, franchise qualifications were considered “matters of fundamental or constitutional, 
rather than statute, law: legislatures… were permitted to enact laws that concretized or carried out 
constitutional provisions, but they did not possess the power to alter suffrage qualifications.”60  
 After its introduction to the Senate on February 18, 1887, the Anti-Mormon Bill was 
referred to the Standing Committee on the Judiciary.61  On February 24, John Foley, the 
committee chair and senator from Esmeralda County, issued an unfavorable report on the bill and 
recommended that it not be passed.62  At Foley’s request the bill was then tabled.63  After its 
removal from the table on March 1, 1887, the bill came up for vote before a closely divided 
Senate.   During the final debate and vote, it survived numerous attempts to be tabled again, 
postponed indefinitely, and drastically revised (Senator Harris moved to strike out the words “the 
Church of Latter-day Saints,” and “Mormon Church” from the Bill in a last-ditch effort to shore 
up its constitutionality), and passed by a final vote of 12-8.64  Within just over a year of the 
passage of the bill’s passage, however, the Nevada Supreme Court, wielding Cooley’s treatise on 
constitutional limitations as its weapon of choice, ruled it unconstitutional. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
(Cornell University Press, 2002).  For important early research along similar lines, see Alan Jones, “Thomas M. 
Cooley and ‘Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism’: A Reconsideration,” Journal of American History, 53 (1967), 751-771.   
59 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 167. 
60 Ibid. 
61 13th Session Nev. Senate Journal, 217, 218, 236. 
62 Ibid, 236. 
63 Ibid, 239. 
64 13th Session Nev. Senate Journal, 296.   
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The Lessons of Failure in Nevada: 
 In 1888, George B. Whitney, a Mormon resident of Panaca township in Lincoln County, 
attempted to register to vote for the election that was to be held later that year.65  Whitney offered 
to take the state’s original oath for electors, but refused to take the new oath established by the 
Anti-Mormon Bill because of his affiliation with the LDS Church.66  After being turned away, 
Whitney petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court to grant a writ of mandamus compelling the local 
registry agent, A.M. Findlay, to add his name to the list of qualified voters.67  Whitney argued that 
the statute was invalid on two counts.  First, he claimed, the Anti-Mormon Bill should have been 
ruled unconstitutional because the state legislature lacked the constitutional authority to so 
aggressively limit the franchise.  Whitney also averred that the bill abridged the free exercise of 
religion guaranteed by the Nevada Constitution.    
 Pundits and politicians awaited the Court’s decision in State v. Findlay (1888) eagerly, 
even though attempts to annex southern Idaho had been thwarted before the case came to the 
Court.68  Despite several efforts to gain the support of the U.S. Congress and Democratic 
President Grover Cleveland, Senator Stewart’s bid for annexation was thoroughly defeated by the 
time the Court handed down its decision. Cleveland ended the Republican Stewart’s initial 
proposal for the partition of Idaho with a pocket veto and Idaho residents, many of whom had 
mixed or negative reactions to Stewart’s territorial ambitions in any event, focused their energies 
on gaining statehood.69   
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 While it is impossible to know whether the Court’s rejection of the legislature’s Article XI claims would have been 
affected if the annexation would of transpired, nothing in the opinion itself suggests that the decision would have 
been reversed in that instance. 
69 See Elliott, Servant of Power, 105-6. 
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 While faint hopes of annexing of part of western Utah may have perpetuated the desire of 
some to keep the bill alive, it seems clear that anti-Mormon sentiments played a significant role in 
efforts to sustain the legislation with a victory in the courts.  Any legal protection or recognition 
of the Mormon Church could have thrown up obstacles that might impede future efforts in the 
broader campaign against the Latter-day Saints in the western states and territories.  Stewart’s 
words to one of Findlay’s attorneys emphasized the potential dangers of a verdict in favor of 
Whitney: 
It would be very dangerous to allow the Mormons to vote in our State.  The proposition to colonize and take 
possession of our State Government is seriously considered by the Mormon Church… I hope the Supreme 
Court will not by a strained construction of the Constitution make a decision that will place Nevada at the 
mercy of the Mormons.70  
    
Thus admonished, Findlay’s counsel answered claims that the legislature had exceeded its 
constitutional authority by creating an argument based on Article II, section 6 of the Nevada 
Constitution.  The section stated that “provisions shall be made by law for the registration of… 
electors… to preserve the purity of elections, and… the legislature shall have power to prescribe 
by law any other or further rules or oaths as may be deemed necessary, as a test of electoral 
qualifications.”71  This contention relied on the preamble to the Anti-Mormon Bill, which claimed 
the voter regulations it enforced fell within the parameters of the legislative duty to promote the 
purity of elections in Nevada.  In an attempt to reconcile the bill with Article II, section 6, the 
preamble stated, “[i]t is deemed necessary for the peace and safety of the people of this state to 
exclude from participation in the electoral franchise all persons belonging to the self styled 
‘Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.’”72   
                                                 
70 Stewart to T.H. Wells, Sept. 17, 1888 quoted in Elliott, Servant of Power, 107. 
71 Constitution of the State of Nevada, Article II, section 6. 
72 See State v. Findlay (1888).     
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 The goals of maintaining the integrity of the electoral system and disenfranchising large 
numbers of voters may seem mutually exclusive today, but not in the late nineteenth century.  The 
great historian of the South, C. Vann Woodward, phrased his account of the disenfranchisement 
of African-Americans in the region in terms of a tacit agreement between warring conservative 
and radical factions not to injure the purity of the electoral process through attempts to 
manipulate, or curry favor with, blacks.73  And while efforts to introduce the widespread use of 
the silent, or Australian, ballot were due in large part to an urge to purge the electoral system of 
corruption, the primary benefit many southern legislators saw in the system was that, “the need to 
read and mark the ballot would require a degree of literacy that might well disqualify a large 
number of blacks.”74   
Unlike parallel arguments made by southern politicians, however, the Nevada legislature’s 
claim that the disenfranchisement of Mormons was necessary to “protect the peace and safety” of 
Nevada did not survive constitutional challenge.  Responding to Findlay’s argument with a 
unanimous opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the state legislature alone had no 
authority to so dramatically restrict the franchise.75  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas 
P. Hawley, Stewart’s friend and fellow Republican,76 ruled that the Anti-Mormon Bill violated 
Article II, section 177 of the Constitution of the State of Nevada: 
                                                 
73 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 83. 
74 Michael Perman, Struggle for Mastery: Disenfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908 (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2001), 20. 
75 Cooley’s decision in People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 (1867), made during his tenure as a Michigan State 
Supreme Court Justice, is perhaps the best example of this jurisprudence in practice. 
76 See Elliott, Servant of Power, 238-42. 
77 Article II, section I read (as of 1888): 
 
Every male citizen of the United States (not laboring under the disabilities named in this constitution) of the age of twenty-one years 
and upwards, who shall have actually, and not constructively, resided in the state six months, and in the district or county thirty days 
next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that are now or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all 
questions submitted to the election: provided, that no person who has been or may be convicted of treason or felony in any state or 
territory of the United States, unless restored to civil rights, and no person who, after arriving at the age of eighteen years, shall have 
voluntarily borne arms against the United States, or held civil or military office under the so-called Confederate States, or either of them 
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It is not within the power of the legislature to deny, abridge, extend, or change the qualifications of a voter 
as prescribed by the constitution of the state… The right of suffrage, as conferred by the Constitution, is 
beyond the reach of any such legislative interference [;] it cannot be changed except by the… power that 
established it, viz., the people, in their direct sovereign capacity.”78 
   
 The Court granted Whitney’s request for a writ of mandamus and threw out the bill, but it 
declined to rule on Whitney’s free exercise claims.  Article I, section 4 of the Constitution created 
a broad, but not boundless, protection of religious freedom.  The provision enjoined that, “liberty 
of [conscience]… shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices 
inconsistent with the peace, or safety of this State.”79 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had already ruled that anti-polygamy laws did not 
violate the free exercise of religion as protected by the U.S. Constitution,80 the Nevada court was 
unwilling to rule on Whitney’s Article I claims and stated that the acceptance of Whitney’s 
understanding of Article II, section 1 obviated any need for further exploration of the issue.81  The 
Court’s ruling that the disenfranchisement of Mormons did not significantly contribute to the 
state’s “peace and safety” would seemingly have led to the logical affirmation of Whitney’s free 
exercise claims, but the Court would not go so far as to offer an endorsement of the Mormon 
Church that might impede later attempts to deal definitively with the Latter-day Saints.  By 
choosing not to rule on these claims, the Court managed to adhere both to the doctrine of limited 
legislative interference and to the U.S. Supreme Court’s religious jurisprudence, as outlined in 
several rulings against the Mormons.  In this sense, then, the Court’s rejection of the Anti-
                                                                                                                                                               
unless an amnesty be granted to such by the federal government; and no idiot or insane person shall be entitled to the privilege of an 
elector.  Constitution of the State of Nevada, Article II, section 1. 
78 State v. Findlay (1888). Unfortunately, whether the Court’s ruling actually called an immediate halt to the practice 
of Mormon disenfranchisement in Nevada is unclear.  While the Court approved Whitney’s petition for a writ of 
mandamus, the statute was not officially repealed until 1909.  See Dana R. Bennett, Nevada State Library and 
Archives Information Political History of Nevada, available online at: 
http://dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/nsla/archives/political/interest.htm. 
79 Nevada Constitution, Article I, section 4. 
80 See Reynolds v. United States (1878), 98 U.S. 145, 162. 
81 State v. Findlay (1888). 
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Mormon Bill is best seen as an affirmation of notions of restricted legislative powers – insofar as 
they remained loosely congruent with national and regional sentiments toward Mormons – 
delivered in a period when such a legal and constitutional vision was quickly becoming a 
dominant worldview.82        
 The Court’s decision in State v. Findlay (1888) combined with the failure of Nevada’s 
efforts to annex southern Idaho to take the wind out of Nevada anti-Mormon’s sails.  With the 
principal pragmatic rationale for disenfranchisement gone and the Court’s decision producing a 
sense of constitutional impropriety, the proposed amendment proved unviable.  The election of 
1888 decimated the once solid anti-Mormon bloc in the state senate.  Eleven of the twenty 
senators in office during the 1889 term had not been members of the upper house when the Anti-
Mormon Bill and Proposed Amendment XII passed.83  At least nine of the eleven senatorial 
newcomers opposed the amendment.84  After three postponed votes, the Senate defeated the 
amendment by a 12-6 vote on February 5, 1889.85   
The crushing defeat of Proposed Amendment XII in the same house that had created it, 
along with the state Supreme Court’s verdict in State v. Findlay (1888), effectively ended the 
prospects for de jure Mormon disenfranchisement in Nevada.  The defeats of the Silver State’s 
anti-Mormons were unusual in the broader campaign against Mormon polygamy in the West, 
however.  Nevada’s ill-fated adventures in Mormon disenfranchisement proved instructive for 
other western legislatures in their attempts to remove voting privileges from Mormons in their 
own states and territories.  Specifically, lawmakers learned that well-crafted felony 
                                                 
82 See Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought, 78-80, 123-174; Grey, “Langdell’s Orthodoxy.” 
83 Senators Foley, Forbes, Harris, Hardesty, Kaiser, Nicholls, Noteware, Osborn, and Sharon were the nine remaining 
members of the upper house.  See Journal of the Fourteenth Session of the Senate of the State of Nevada, 1889, 5. 
84 Senators Comins, Dunlop, Emmit, La grave, Millet, Sawyer, Sproule, Torre, and Williams would eventually vote 
against the Amendment; among the newly-elected senators only Sen. Gallagher supported it passage.  Ibid, 107.   
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disenfranchisement provisions remained the most constitutionally sound means of 
disenfranchising Mormons.  Two years after the Nevada Court’s decision in State v. Findlay 
(1888), the U.S. Supreme Court’s acceptance of modified felony disenfranchisement laws 
elsewhere in the West sounded one of the last and loudest death knells for Mormon polygamy. 
Idaho’s Answer to the Mormon Question: 
 Seeking to allay fears that Mormons would overrun southern Idaho, and concerned that, “a 
simple proscription against Mormons,” such as the one overturned in Nevada, “would [not] get by 
the Supreme Court,” Idaho’s legislature created a novel set of test oaths and disenfranchisement 
laws that culminated with the passage of § 501, Revised Statutes of Idaho, popularly known as the 
Idaho Test Oath Bill.86  This law attempted to strip all Mormons – polygamous and non – of their 
voting privileges through a combination of felony disenfranchisement and guilt by association.  
The test oath law targeted Mormons by denying the vote, not only to those who committed 
bigamy and polygamy, but also to those who encouraged, or belonged to an organization that 
encouraged, such practices.87 
 Without specifically outlawing Mormonism and without directly ordering the 
disenfranchisement of all Latter Days Saints (a policy sure to resurrect State v. Findlay [1888]), 
Idaho anti-Mormons created a law that could effectively disenfranchise the territory’s entire 
Mormon population as long as the Mormon Church subscribed to a pro-polygamy doctrine. 
Completing the pattern established by Nevada’s adventures in disenfranchisement and the 
Edmunds Act, however, § 501 came under fire almost immediately.  Mormons in the territory 
launched an all-out campaign against the bill, eventually finding themselves in the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                               
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid, 59; Revised Statutes of Idaho Territory, § 501. 
87 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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Court.  Davis v. Beason (1890), the case spawned by the bill, was argued before the Court as 
Idaho was preparing its Constitution in an attempt to join the union as a state.     
 Large portions of the Idaho State Constitutional Convention were devoted to the issue of 
Mormon voting rights, as the delegates debated whether to include a provision similar to § 501 in 
their new Constitution with the impending Davis decision hanging over their heads.88  In the end, 
however, most of the delegates remained confident that the bill would be upheld, and that felony 
disenfranchisement, aimed at the territory’s Mormon population was the most effective means of 
making sure that no Mormons would be able to participate in the new state’s political system.  
The final version of the constitutional provision was all but identical to the territorial statute.   
 Still, many remained unconvinced of the validity of Idaho’s disenfranchisement provision.  
A New York Times article on Idaho’s prospects for admission ran in February, 1890 with the 
headline “Idaho’s Unstable Claims,” and Congress, while eager to admit a new state with 
precious metal and valuable mineral deposits, was wary of doing so should Idaho’s test oath fail 
to pass constitutional muster.89  “If the test oath is declared to be unconstitutional,” the article 
stated, “there will be no effort in the direction of statehood.”90  As it turned out, however, the 
Idaho legislature’s confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court was well placed.   Writing on behalf of 
a unanimous court in the Davis case Justice Field presented the nation with an unequivocal 
sanction of the Idaho test oath, and a booming condemnation of polygamy.”91  Field’s opinion 
eviscerated the campaign for national acceptance on the part of western Mormons (at least on 
                                                 
88 Idaho State Constitutional Convention, Commissions and Amendments (1890). 
89 “Idaho’s Unstable Claims: the Territory’s Desire to Become a State,” New York Times, February 19, 1890, 2-3. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 55-85. 
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their terms) and represented one of the final deathblows for the practice of (and concurrence with) 
polygamy within the Mormon Church.92  
Davis v. Beason (1890):   
 Samuel B. Davis renounced the Mormon faith just prior to the 1888 election, took the 
Idaho test oath, voted a Democratic ticket, and then promptly rejoined the Church following the 
election.  Davis was then arrested and indicted, along with several other erstwhile Mormons who 
had voted in the election.  Davis, however, was the only defendant to have officially rejoined the 
Church, and was convicted of “conspiracy to unlawfully pervert and obstruct the due 
administration of the laws of the Territory.”93  From the perspective of those attempting to 
challenge the territory’s anti-Mormon voting policies there was a major problem with the 
peculiarities of Davis’ case.  One of the main objections to the Idaho statute was that it 
represented a bill of pains and penalties.  That is to say, the oath’s opponents felt the bill punished 
citizens without a trial.  Davis had been tried and convicted of a crime.  Pressed by the imminent 
acceptance of Idaho into the union and an upcoming election in 1890, however, opponents to the 
Idaho test oath were left with few, if any, alternatives. 
 Davis’ attorneys laid out their case in four stages.  They claimed their client had been 
deprived of the privileges and immunities of citizenship without due process of law.  Davis’ 
lawyers also asserted that the test oath prohibited free exercise of religion in the territory (a 
somewhat wobbly claim given the precedent established by Reynolds v. United States [1878]).  
They also argued that the “Idaho statute violate[d] the provision in article 6 of the Constitution of 
the United States, that ‘No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or 
                                                 
92 Ibid, 225-8. 
93 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
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public trust under the United States.’”94 Davis’ fourth claim was founded along Supremacy 
Clause lines.  Since Congress had, through the Edmunds Act, protected those who simply agreed 
with legitimacy of the practice of plural marriage from the same prohibitions and punishments 
leveled at polygamists themselves, Davis averred, the Idaho provision should have been 
overridden by its federal counterpart.95 
 Seizing on Davis’ flimsy 1st Amendment claims, Justice Field almost completely ignored 
the more cogent Due Process Clause and Article 6 components of the anti-test oath argument and 
dismissed its Supremacy Clause reasoning with a few terse lines.  Most of Field’s decision was 
either a reaffirmation of Reynolds v. U.S. (1878) and Murphy v. Ramsey (1885), or an 
authoritative condemnation of Mormonism and polygamy: 
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes of all civilized and Christian countries… They tend to destroy the purity 
of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman and debase man.  Few crimes are 
more pernicious to the best interests of society and receive more general or more deserved punishment.  To 
extend exemption from punishment for such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the 
community.  To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind.96 
 
Davis v. Beason (1890) was essentially a case, not about the legality of polygamy, but one 
testing the validity of test oaths as a means of disenfranchisement.  Yet an intelligent person, 
ignorant of the case’s background, would probably not be able to discern this basic underlying 
fact by reading the decision alone.  Only very briefly and dismissively did Field even touch upon 
the validity of the test oath in question.  The oath, according to a seemingly nonchalant Field, was 
“not open to any valid legal objection.”97  Field neglected to use the phrases “due process,” 
“Article 6,” and “bill of attainder” at any point in his decision.   
                                                 
94 Davis v. Beason (1890), brief from appellant’s counsel; see also Reynolds v. United States (1878), 98 U.S. 145, 
162. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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At the time it was handed down, Field’s opinion was, for the most part, celebrated as 
having simultaneously settled the issue of polygamy in the West and cleared the way for the 
introduction of a new state into the union.  While Field’s legal reasoning, or lack thereof, in Davis 
has since become the source of harsh scrutiny, the opinion certainly would seem to have had the 
effect its author desired.  On October 6, 1890, acting on a “revelation” received by Wilford 
Woodruff, the President of the Church of Latter Day Saints, the Church Body voted to end its 
sanction of the practice of polygamy.  And Idaho was, of course, admitted as a state, though not 
without continued conflict over the legitimacy of the test oath and corresponding state 
constitutional provision.   
Five members of the U.S. Congress (C.H. Mansur, William M. Springer, George T. 
Barnes, J.E. Washington, O.B. Kilgore) issued a minority report to Congress’ recommendation 
that Idaho become a state.  The minority report was stridently critical of the Davis decision, 
claiming that it represented a total departure from all precedent with regard to felony 
disenfranchisement laws.  After reprinting every state constitutional provision ever to 
disenfranchise felons (each requiring conviction for disenfranchisement), the report claimed: 
It is thus that for the first time in American history, save one, the effort is made to depart from this principle 
[conviction before disenfranchisement] for which the minority is now contending.  The exception referred to 
is in the case of the Constitution of the State of Missouri… but in the case of Cummings the Supreme 
Court… held that provision to be unconstitutional.98 
 
The minority report’s reference to Cummings v. Missouri (1866) bears elaboration.  In the 
aftermath of the Civil War, Field had authored an opinion that ruled unconstitutional a Missouri 
State Constitutional provision barring former Confederate sympathizers from poll-booths and 
public offices that had required a test oath similar in tone to the Idaho oath.  The Missouri oath, 
                                                 
98 51st Congress, 1st Session, House Report No. 1064: Admission of Idaho into the Union, p. 42. 
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according to Field and the rest of a slender 5-4 majority in the case, was both an ex post facto law 
and a bill of attainder.99 
The precedent established by Cummings seems, at first glance, troublesome for a Court 
united in their desire to resolve the “Mormon Question” and eliminate the largest potential hurdle 
on Idaho’s road to statehood.  In Cummings, Field had made a series of claims that seemed 
consistent with those of disenfranchised Mormons.  “We do not agree,” wrote Field in 1866, 
claiming that the removal of voting and office-holding privileges was a form of punishment, “that 
‘to punish one is to deprive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to take from him anything 
less than these is no punishment at all.’”100  This statement seemed inconsistent with the Court’s 
position that felony disenfranchisement was not a punishment, but rather a voting regulation and a 
legitimate use of state power.  It should be noted, however, that the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment separated the Cummings and Davis opinions and complicates the connection between 
the two cases.  It seems relatively clear that most commonly accepted constructions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would have insulated the Missouri Constitutional provision from such 
attacks.101  
The admonitions of the congressional minority may have gone unheeded, but they were 
not without significance.  As the minority report suggested, the Davis opinion, coupled with the 
earlier Murphy decision, represented the Court’s wholesale acceptance of a new brand of felony 
disenfranchisement.  That is to say, that through their conviction to eliminate polygamy and settle 
the long-running debate over Mormonism, the Supreme Court gave their tacit, and perhaps 
inadvertent, approval to targeted felony disenfranchisement in the West and elsewhere.   
                                                 
99 Cummings v. Missouri 71 U.S. 277 (1866) 
100 Ibid. 
101 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) for contrasting opinions as to whether such a construction is valid. 
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Conclusion: 
The legacy of Murphy v. Ramsey (1885) and Davis v. Beason (1890) has been one of 
surprising endurance and importance.  While the modern-day Supreme Court has generally 
recognized the flawed reasoning behind the extension of felony disenfranchisement to those who 
merely assent to a criminal act, much of Field’s opinion remains good law and has been relied 
upon as precedent in a number of high profile cases in the twentieth century.102 
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter denied the validity of claims that laws forcing Jehovah’s Witnesses to swear 
allegiance to the flag, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, citing Davis as precedent.103    
More recently conservative members of the Rehnquist court have claimed that the logic of 
denying voting privileges to polygamists should extend to state laws that discriminate against 
homosexuals.  Large portions of Justice Antonin Scalia’s acerbic dissent in the landmark gay-
rights case Romer v. Evans (1996) dealt with the legacy of Murphy and Davis (with the latter 
featuring most prominently). 
In Romer, the Court overturned Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution, which 
forbade any attempt to protect the legal or political status of individuals on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.  The 6-3 majority opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, claimed that 
the Colorado amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Scalia argued that the case was analogous to Davis insofar as both cased involved, “the effort by 
the majority of citizens to preserve its view of sexual morality statewide, against the efforts of a 
                                                 
102 This portion of the Davis opinion was largely abrogated by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  In a 
unanimous per curium decision, the Court held that speech or action that advocated illegal behavior was protected by 
the First Amendment.  The Court has since recognized that this decision effectively defeated the logic of upholding 
the Idaho test oath, but that the other elements of Davis remain good law.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority to undermine it.”104  Scalia went 
even further in drawing his analogy between the struggles of Mormons and anti-polygamists in 
the late nineteenth-century West and gay-rights activists and Christian conservative groups in the 
1990s: 
The Court labors mightily to get around Beason… but cannot escape the central fact that this Case found the 
statute at issue – which went much further than [the Colorado Amendment], denying polygamists not merely 
special treatment but the right to vote – “not open to any constitutional or legal objection.”… The Court’s 
disposition today suggests that… polygamy must be permitted in the States… unless, of course, polygamists 
for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexuals.105  
 
The Romer Court’s majority rejected Scalia’s application of the Davis precedent and the 
Gobitis decision was overturned in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).106  But 
the Supreme Court has thus far refused to discontinue its adherence to the anti-Mormon cases 
when considering felony disenfranchisement laws.  Writing for a 6-3 majority in Richardson v. 
Ramirez, Justice William Rehnquist relied upon the precedent established by the Mormon 
disenfranchisement cases in deciding that felony disenfranchisement laws were a valid exercise of 
state power.  Although the Court had never before ruled on the validity of felony 
disenfranchisement, Rehnquist found analogies drawn between the anti-Mormon cases and the 
California law in question in Ramirez persuasive.107  In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
offered a very different account of the proper place for these cases.  Marshall critiqued the 
majority’s logic by claiming that modern-day conceptions of the franchise were at odds with 
Rehnquist’s reliance upon Davis and Murphy: 
The process of democracy is one of change.  Our laws are not frozen into immutable form, they are 
constantly in the process of revision in response to the needs of a changing society… This Court’s holding in 
Davis... [and] Murphy... that a State may disenfranchise a class of voters to “withdraw all political influence 
from those who are practically hostile” to the existing order strikes at the very heart of the democratic 
                                                                                                                                                               
103 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
104 Romer v. Evans. 
105 Ibid. 
106 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 391 U.S. 624 (1943). 
107 Richardson v. Ramirez (1973). 
 28
 
process…  The ballot is the democratic system’s coin of the realm.  To condition its exercise on support of 
the established order is to debase that currency beyond recognition.  Rather than resurrect Davis and 
Murphy, I would expressly disavow any continued adherence to the dangerous notions therein expressed.108  
 
For all their power and prescience, Marshall’s words have gone largely unheeded.  The 
effects of felony disenfranchisement are being felt with a greater force than ever before in our 
nation.109  Consider, for example, that in a presidential election decided by a few hundred votes or 
less in Florida, that state prohibited approximately 650,000 felons and ex-felons from casting 
ballots in Election 2000.110   
Even more disturbing, and evocative of the spirit in which many current felony 
disenfranchisement laws were created, these laws continue to disproportionately punish 
minorities.  Approximately 13.1% of all African-American men in America are disenfranchised 
by such laws (as opposed to approximately 2.1% of the nation as a whole), and ten states 
(Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wyoming) disenfranchise at least 20% of their black male population.111  An equally significant 
statistic emblematic of the historical progression of these laws in the U.S. comes from Utah, the 
state with the nation’s largest Mormon population, and one seldom thought of as a center of 
progressive political thought and policy, which disenfranchises no felons at all.112 
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